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When litigants present a court with a dispute over a recently changed election law, 
should it handle the case any differently than a dispute over a longstanding election 
law? Imagine, for instance, two states. State A has no early voting. State B used to 
provide thirty-five days of early voting but has recently cut that period back to 
twenty-eight days. A federal court is probably more likely to conclude that State B 
has improperly burdened the right to vote.1  
Litigants seeking to lift burdens on the right to vote and judges adjudicating these 
claims have an unremarkable problem—what is the benchmark for measuring these 
burdens? Legal theories abound for claims under the constellation of rights known 
as the “right to vote.”2 And when a legislature changes a voting practice or procedure, 
courts may have an easy benchmark—they can consider what the right to vote looked 
like before and after the enactment of the new law, and they can evaluate a litigant’s 
claim on that basis. Recently, federal courts have been relying on this benchmark for 
the main causes of action litigants might raise after a new law has been enacted—a 
Section 2 challenge under the Voting Rights Act, a freedom of association claim 
subject to the Burdick balancing test, and an Equal Protection analysis derived from 
Bush v. Gore.3 And frequently, courts have found that new laws that eliminate once-
available voting practices or procedures fail.4 
I describe this new practice as the Democracy Ratchet. The concept of a judicial 
ratchet is hardly a new concept in constitutional law,5 nor is the concept of a 
particular rule of interpretation when it comes to election law.6 And one form of 
review under the Voting Rights Act, non-retrogression, once functioned as a ratchet.7 
But it is only recently that a convergence of factors have driven courts to (often 
unwittingly) adopt the Democracy Ratchet more broadly: the demise of Section 5 of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights 
Law, 92 IND. L.J. 299, 305 (2016) (“Ohio would have had more early-voting days than most 
states, and certainly more than my home state of New York, which has none. Can the Ohio 
law be legally challenged without also declaring New York’s failure to allow early voting to 
be even more unlawful?”). 
 2. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About 
Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709–20 (1993) (distinguishing voting as participation, 
voting as aggregation, and voting as governance); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2016) (discussing the relationship between the right to vote and the 
right of association). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in 
Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1211 (1998); see also ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL 
JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT 65–97 (1971). 
 6. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1051 (2010); Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1369 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009). 
 7. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012 & Supp. 2016); see also 
Jeffries & Levison, supra note 5; infra Section III.A.1. 
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the Voting Rights Act, the trend toward raising vote denial claims under Section 2, 
the lack of guidance surrounding the Burdick balancing test, the increase of litigation 
surrounding election laws generally, partisanship in state legislatures, and many 
tweaks to election laws.8 
Ratchets operate in one direction and cannot move in the other direction, absent 
extraordinary effort.9 The same holds true for many laws concerning voting practices 
and procedures. A legislature can expand such opportunities, but courts scrutinize 
cutbacks on such opportunities with deep skepticism—deeper than had no such 
opportunity ever existed. The ratchet tightens options, squeezing the discretion that 
legislatures once had. This Article seeks to solve the puzzle of how courts have 
scrutinized, and should scrutinize, legislative changes to election laws. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I identifies recent instances in which 
federal courts have invoked a version of the Democracy Ratchet. It identifies the 
salient traits of the Democracy Ratchet in these cases. Part II describes why the 
Democracy Ratchet has gained attention, primarily as a tactic of litigants and as a 
convenient benchmark in preliminary injunction cases. Part III examines the history 
of the major federal causes of action concerning election administration—Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act, the Burdick balancing test, and the Equal Protection Clause. 
In each, it traces the path of the doctrine to a point where a version of the Democracy 
Ratchet might be incorporated into the test. It concludes that these causes of action 
do not include a substantive Democracy Ratchet. Part IV turns to determine how the 
Democracy Ratchet might be used. It concludes that the Democracy Ratchet is best 
identified as an evidentiary device and a readily available remedy for courts 
fashioning relief. It then offers suggestions for its appropriate use. Part V identifies 
some concerns with existing use of the Democracy Ratchet and instances in which 
litigants or courts may incorrectly use the Democracy Ratchet. It offers guidance for 
courts handling changes to election laws.  
I. THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET IN ACTION 
In a handful of cases in recent years, federal courts have faced disputes about a 
new election law. The law in question eliminated some portion of a previously-
existing voting practice or procedure. Litigants sought to strike down the law. And 
courts in the cases below invoked a form of the Democracy Ratchet in doing so. 
While the merits and details of the specific legal claims raised will be discussed 
in Part III, federal courts have used the Democracy Ratchet regardless of the cause 
of action—a Voting Rights Act claim under Section 2;10 a Fourteenth Amendment 
claim under the Supreme Court’s balancing test set forth in cases like Anderson v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See infra Part III.  
 9. A ratchet is distinct from a socket wrench, which performs the functions of a ratchet 
but permits movement in another direction with little effort. Handcuffs and subway turnstiles 
are two of the most common types of ratchets—they move in a single direction and do not 
permit movement in the other direction. There are ways to release a ratchet—the keys to the 
handcuffs, for instance, would permit one to move the cuffs in the other direction—but they 
require something extra designed to disable the ratchet’s function. 
 10. See infra Section III.A. 
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Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi;11 or a Bush v. Gore-style claim for arbitrary 
treatment of voters.12 
At the outset, it is worth noting that procedural oddities sometimes ultimately 
dominate these cases and may limit their precedential value. For instance, some occur 
in short-fused litigation, especially on a preliminary injunction standard, and may not 
survive in their present form when the case reaches the merits on a permanent 
injunction. Appellate courts stayed or vacated other decisions. Nevertheless, they are 
emblematic of courts beginning to develop the contours of the legal doctrine. These 
courts tend to find that the previously existing legal framework is the baseline for the 
“right to vote,” and litigation is viewed through the lens of burdens placed upon that 
preexisting constellation. 
A. Ohio Early Voting, 2014 
Before 2005, Ohio had no early in-person voting, and absentee voting was only 
available for individuals who met one of several exceptions.13 In 2005, the legislature 
enacted changes to this system.14 It permitted no-excuse early voting and allowed for 
early in-person voting at least thirty-five days before the election.15 Because Ohio 
voters must register at least thirty days before an election, there was a five-day period 
in which a voter could register to vote and cast a ballot on the same day.16 In 2014, 
the legislature enacted a new law with more changes, including moving the first day 
of early voting to the day after the close of voter registration, which reduced the 
number of days of early voting to twenty-nine.17 
In Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 
preliminary injunction that prevented implementation of the new law.18 It concluded 
that the burden on African American, lower-income, and homeless voters was 
“significant” under Anderson-Burdick, and that such groups “disproportionately” 
used early in-person voting.19 That voters might change their behavior “such that 
overall turnout might not be affected ‘is not determinative of the Equal Protection 
analysis.’”20 
The Sixth Circuit in Husted also construed the disparate treatment analysis in 
Bush v. Gore. It concluded that the “motivating principle” of Bush v. Gore was 
“instructive,” that “‘[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms’—such as 
expanding early voting opportunities—‘the State may not, by later arbitrary and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See infra Section III.B. 
 12. See infra Section III.C. 
 13. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2014), 
vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 524. 
 19. Id. at 544–45 
 20. Id. at 541. 
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disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another’—for example, by 
making it substantially harder for certain groups to vote than others.”21 
Finally, in an analysis under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the court 
concluded that a comparison to previously available opportunities was “relevant to 
an assessment of whether, under the current system, African Americans have an 
equal opportunity to participate in the political process as compared to other 
voters.”22 Because black voters disproportionately used the early voting procedures 
that had been scaled back, the change to the law ran afoul of Section 2.23 
B. Florida Signature Matching, 2016 
Before 2004, each county in Florida had different procedures for curing problems 
with signatures on vote-by-mail ballots.24 If there was no signature, or if the signature 
on the vote-by-mail ballot mismatched the signature on file, counties had procedures 
on how to solve this problem.25 In 2004, Florida enacted a law that required all 
counties to reject vote-by-mail ballots that lacked a signature or had a mismatched 
signature, with no opportunity to remedy these deficiencies.26 In 2013, the Florida 
legislature amended the law to permit voters to remedy ballots that lacked a 
signature, but it did not include opportunities for voters to remedy ballots that had a 
mismatched signature.27  
A federal district court in 2016 found that the law ran afoul of the Burdick 
balancing test.28 It determined that the burden was “severe,” because ballots returned 
by mail with a mismatched signature would not be counted without adequate 
justification—going so far as to call it “illogical, irrational, and patently bizarre.”29 
It concluded that there was “no reason that same procedure cannot be implemented 
(rather, re-implemented) for mismatched-signature ballots,” because “prior to 2004 . 
. . voters had the ability to cure both mismatched-signature ballots and no-signature 
ballots.”30 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Id. at 542 n.4 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per curiam)). 
 22. Id. at 558.  
 23. Id. The parties would ultimately settle this litigation, and a subsequent challenge in 
Ohio was unsuccessful. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 629 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(emphasizing that states need not “maximize voting convenience”). 
 24. Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner, No. 4:16cv607-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6090943, at 
*2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016). 
 25. Id. at *2–3. 
 26. Id. at *3. 
 27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.68(4)(a) (West 2015). The final vote on House Bill 7013 was 
115-1 in the House and 27-13 in the Senate, and the bill became law. CS/HB 7013: Elections, 
FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/7013/?Tab=VoteHistory [https:// 
perma.cc/R8P8-XX5X]. 
 28. Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, at *18–19. 
 29. Id. at *22.  
 30. Id. at *25.  
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C. Arizona Ballot Harvesting, 2016 
In 2016, Arizona enacted a law that generally precluded individuals from 
collecting early ballots from voters.31 The statute authorized exceptions to this 
general rule, such as “election officials, mail carriers, [and] family members.”32 
Arizona permitted a variety of early voting opportunities and allowed early ballots 
to be deposited at any polling place on Election Day.33 This law, however, trimmed 
back the practice of “ballot harvesting,” which the Arizona Democratic Party had 
used extensively since at least 2002.34 After a district court35 and the Ninth Circuit36 
upheld the law, the Ninth Circuit en banc would have enjoined the law as running 
afoul of the Burdick balancing test and the Voting Rights Act. 
The en banc court adopted a finding by the dissenting judge in the previous case 
that the law placed a “substantial” burden on voters in urban and rural areas, 
particularly in places that lacked home mail delivery and reliable transportation.37 
The dissent weighed that burden against the “weak” interest in preventing voter 
fraud, where specific instances of illegal ballot collection, which had previously been 
permitted in Arizona, were nonexistent.38 In particular, the dissent found that “a 
substantial number of minority voters used ballot collection as their means of 
voting,”39 a reflection of reliance on the past practice:  
[W]hen 80% of the electorate uses early absentee voting as the method 
by which they cast their ballots, the method has transcended convenience 
and has become instead a practical necessity. Thus, when severe burdens 
are placed on this form of voting, it has a significant impact on elections 
and the right to vote.40 
The dissent also found that the regulation would have run afoul of Section 2, as 
the harm disproportionately fell on minority voters and the “totality of the 
circumstances” established that plaintiffs would win on a Section 2 challenge.41 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1005 (2017); see Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s 
Office, 840 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 841 F.3d 791 (9th Cir.), injunction 
pending appeal granted, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016).  
 32. Feldman, 840 F.3d at 1063.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1064. 
 35. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Ariz. 2016).  
 36. Feldman, 840 F.3d at 1086.  
 37. Id. at 1088–90 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting), adopted en banc, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 
2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016). 
 38. Feldman, 840 F.3d at 1089–90 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. at 1088. 
 40. Id. at 1089. 
 41. Id. at 1096–97. 
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D. Michigan Straight-Ticket Voting, 2016 
Michigan had a practice of “straight-ticket” voting since 1891.42 The practice 
permitted voters to cast a vote for all nominees of a particular political party for all 
offices on the ballot with a single mark.43 The Sixth Circuit applied the Burdick 
balancing test and concluded that the burden placed upon voters because of the 
elimination of straight-ticket voting was moderate. That burden was found moderate 
because wait times would increase, African American voters would be 
disproportionately affected, and voters could be confused because of a change to the 
ballot marking system.44 The state lacked sufficient justifications for the law.45 
The court also concluded that the law ran afoul of Section 2 because African 
American voters disproportionately used straight-ticket voting, and that the burden 
was linked to historical conditions regarding African American voters.46 
E. Examining the Democracy Ratchet 
These courts all took similar approaches in approaching the changes to election 
laws. They each share four hallmarks of what I would identify as the Democracy 
Ratchet. 
First, a state changed an election law in such a way that it eliminated a previously 
available voting practice or procedure (sometimes, a practice or procedure of recent 
vintage). Ohio eliminated six days of early voting that had only been available for a 
couple of election cycles. Florida prohibited signature correction for mismatched or 
absence of signature, and later permitted signature correction for absence of signature 
only. Arizona limited ballot harvesting. Michigan ended the practice of straight-
ticket voting.47 
Second, in the ensuing litigation, under whichever federal cause of action the case 
arises under, the new law was compared against the preexisting benchmark of the 
old law. In each case, courts and litigants examined the availability and use of 
previous voting opportunities that no longer existed. 
Third, the court expressed heightened skepticism, explicit or implicit, as a result 
of the change, sometimes presuming that the right to vote has been burdened in some 
way. A stronger version of the Democracy Ratchet would call for a high evidentiary 
showing from the new law’s proponents before the law could take effect; a weaker 
version would require less. In each case, courts found the state’s justification for the 
change wanting—because the states’ justification was relatively weak, the burden on 
voters was relatively heavy, or both. 
Fourth, the court is more likely to restore the old practice or procedure as a result 
of its heightened skepticism. In each of these cases, the courts restored the old 
practice (at times, subject to appeal or a hearing on the merits). 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Instit. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 662–69.  
 45. Id. at 666.  
 46. Id. at 666–69.  
 47. See supra Section I.A–D.  
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F. Resistance to the Democracy Ratchet 
It would be an overstatement to say that the Democracy Ratchet exists with full 
force across jurisdictions or that it has been consistently applied. In 2004, for 
instance, Florida enacted a law that permitted up to fourteen days of early voting, 
including the Sunday before Election Day.48 In 2011, it enacted a law that reduced 
the total number of early voting days to eight, permitting up to ninety-six hours of 
early voting (the same as the old law), and abolishing voting the Sunday before 
Election Day, among other changes.49 At the time, five counties in Florida were 
subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.50 In 2012, the 
Attorney General revealed that he would not object—the five counties would offer 
ninety-six hours of early voting, the same as was available under the old law, and the 
new law was precleared.51 Plaintiffs then challenged the law under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.52 Examining whether the law would “result[] in a denial or 
abridgment of the right . . . to vote,” the court recognized that it would not conduct a 
retrogression analysis.53 Instead, it would conduct a “practical evaluation of the ‘past 
and present reality.’”54 
It is worth noting that the Democracy Ratchet, at least in its present form, has only 
been used in cases affecting the right to vote. It has not (yet) been used in the broader 
set of election law-related cases.55 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
 49. Id. at 1239. 
 50. Id. at 1241–42. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1243. 
 53. Id. at 1249–51 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 
10301 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 54. Id. at 1251 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986)). 
 55. Consider campaign finance laws. When a state reduces the amount of money that 
individuals may contribute to political campaigns, courts do not require the state to justify the 
change in the contribution limits. Instead, courts examine whether the limits, in their present 
form, are appropriately tailored. Lair v. Motl, 873 F.3d 1170, 1181 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (“At 
oral argument, the plaintiffs contended Montana must justify the change between the pre-1994 
limits and today’s limits. Every contribution limit case of which we are aware, however, 
evaluates the current limits, and the plaintiffs point to no authority suggesting otherwise. In 
Randall, for example, the Court evaluated Vermont’s existing limits without discussing 
whether the change from Vermont’s previous regime was justified.” (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 
548 U.S. 230, 237 (2006) (emphasis in original)); see also Thompson v. Dauphinais, 217 F. 
Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Alaska 2017), appeal filed, Thompson v. Hebdon, No. 17-35019 (9th Cir. 
filed Jan. 10, 2017) (upholding new lower contribution limits without comparing to benchmark 
of old limits); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding new lower 
contribution limits without comparing to benchmark of old limits) (“[T]hey argue that these 
initial limits have been successful, so that lower limits are unnecessary. This determination, 
however, is a matter of policy better suited for the legislature . . . .”). But cf. Ala. Democratic 
Conf. v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838 F.3d 1057, 1070 (11th Cir. 2016) (suggesting that question of 
whether plaintiff could sufficiently participate in political dialogue may turn in part upon 
evidence of plaintiff’s behavior “prior to the ban” on political action committee transfers). 
This might be a reason to call this the “Voting Rights Ratchet,” or something narrower, but 
it’s still a device that might be extended to other election law-related cases in the future. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET 
Some courts have independently moved toward adopting a version of the 
Democracy Ratchet—even if their decisions are not always affirmed on appeal. A 
handful of factors may be driving courts toward the Democracy Ratchet. 
A. Litigants Attacking New Laws 
One reason that courts may be using the Democracy Ratchet is because litigants 
are using the Democracy Ratchet. Courts, after all, do not decide election law cases 
sua sponte. They only consider cases and controversies presented to them. 
Of course, legal doctrines like Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Burdick 
balancing test apply to all election laws, including laws that have long been on the 
books. But in recent years, litigants have lacked success in challenging long-existing 
laws. Consider felon disenfranchisement laws. Many of these statutes have been on 
the books for decades. And many have persuasively shown that these statutes 
disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities and those from lower 
socioeconomic classes.56 But courts have consistently rejected challenges to such 
laws, primarily because felon disenfranchisement laws have a sufficiently historical 
pedigree.57 
The historic pedigree of such laws has hardly been sufficient justification in ballot 
access disputes under the Burdick balancing test.58 Indeed, laws that have been on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right 
to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 
GEO. L.J. 259, 261–62 (2004); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: 
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899–1900 (1999); Janai 
S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 603–04 (2013); 
Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 
440 n.26 (2015); see also Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1280–81 n.268 (2012) (addressing the possibility that Congress could 
invoke its power under the Reconstruction Amendments to legislate in the area of felon 
disenfranchisement due to its disparate impact on racial minorities); Richard M. Re & 
Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584 (2012). 
 57. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (rejecting claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment due in part to “the historical and judicial interpretation of the 
Amendment’s applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons”); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting claim under Section 2); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 
F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that felon disenfranchisement laws could not violate 
Section 2 because they “are deeply rooted in our history, in our laws, and in our Constitution”); 
cf. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that Congress intended not to 
address felon disenfranchisement when it enacted and amended Section 2); Johnson v. 
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (concluding once again, that 
Congress intended not to address felon disenfranchisement when it enacted and amended 
Section 2). 
 58. See infra Section III.B. 
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the books for decades and have yielded few minor party candidacies are among the 
ripest targets.59 
But plaintiffs, understandably, choose to marshal their resources as effectively as 
possible.60 Litigants, therefore, are inclined to choose the ripest targets for victory. 
New legislation presents unique opportunities for plaintiffs, particularly for 
organizations who have vocally opposed the new legislation in the media and have a 
chance to stake out opposition in court. An easy benchmark, then, is to compare the 
new law to the old law. These are precisely the types of claims litigants have brought. 
Aggressive litigant skepticism of new election laws has, in turn, put courts in a 
skeptical posture of new election laws. 
Additionally, these older cases emphasizing the historical pedigree of election 
laws work in favor of courts implementing a Democracy Ratchet. Under the older 
cases, the long historical pedigree of laws, such as those causing felon 
disenfranchisement, was a thumb on the scale against a finding that they violated 
Section 2 or the Reconstruction Amendments. Under the newer cases, then, recent 
changes to election laws would require a thumb on the scale in favor of a judicial 
finding that the recent changes are legally problematic.61 Historical practice is not 
simply background research; it dictates which way the court’s inclinations ought to 
lean.62 
Unfortunately for courts, new legislation also means they must speculate about 
the future impact that a new law might have. It’s not truly a ripeness issue—the law 
has been enacted, and it will take effect in the upcoming election. Instead, it is a 
matter of assessing whether the state legislature had the authority to promulgate such 
a law based on the potential impact it might have. Too significant an impact, and the 
law cannot take effect. But litigants, of course, do not want to wait an election 
cycle—much less multiple election cycles—for additional evidence. The evidentiary 
issue is another problem for courts. 
B. The Preliminary Injunction Standard 
Litigants challenging new election laws typically seek injunctive relief.63 They 
also request a preliminary injunction, a remedy with a framework hospitable to the 
application of the Democracy Ratchet. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. See infra Section III.B. 
 60. Cf. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 
55, 71 (2013) (explaining that “private parties will need to make difficult choices as to which 
policies they will challenge” after the demise of Section 5).  
 61. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 869 (E.D. Wis.) (“This reasoning [concerning a 
‘long history’ of a voting practice] obviously does not apply to voter photo identification 
requirements, which are a recent phenomenon.”), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 62. Isaacharoff, supra note 1, at 319–20 (identifying historical consideration as a factor 
courts use in evaluating the validity of changes to election laws). 
 63. The cases described in Part I are typical of litigants who seek to prevent a law from 
taking effect. Indeed, Congress created three-judge district courts in certain election law cases 
in anticipation of injunctive relief. See Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court 
in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 91–92 (1996). 
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Generally, a preliminary injunction is designed to protect the plaintiff from 
“irreparable injury” before the court is able to render a decision after hearing the 
merits of the claim.64 The Supreme Court has explained that a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction must “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that 
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”65 
The preliminary injunction has also been described as necessary to preserve the 
status quo. The Supreme Court has articulated that the purpose of the preliminary 
injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on 
the merits can be held.”66 This description is not without criticism67 and has had an 
uneven application in federal courts.68 Nevertheless, the preservation of the status 
quo was one factor the Ninth Circuit cited in the Arizona ballot harvesting case,69 
and the Sixth Circuit in the straight-ticket voting case.70 
In cases like these, the Democracy Ratchet serves to return the parties to the status 
quo before the new law was enacted, and specifically, to the legal opportunities of 
voters under the old regime. Given the uncertainty of weighing the future in these 
cases,71 the Democracy Ratchet offers a convenient benchmark lacking in other 
contexts. 
The status quo, however, has traditionally been a way a court can ensure that it 
retains jurisdiction through a trial on the merits. That way, the plaintiff can continue 
to seek relief without the risk that the defendant may harm a legally protected interest 
such that the district court cannot fashion relief.72 In election law litigation, that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See generally 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, 
RICHARD L. MARCUS, A. BENJAMIN SPENCER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2947 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing Rule 65(a) and “the procedure on an application 
for a preliminary injunction”). 
 65. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); accord Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (per curiam). 
 66. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
 67. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 525, 546 (1978) (“The status quo shibboleth cannot be justified as a way to limit 
interlocutory judicial meddling, because a court interferes just as much when it orders the 
status quo preserved as when it changes it.”). 
 68. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
109 (2001) (identifying split of authority in federal courts as to the relevance of preserving the 
“status quo”); see also James Powers, Note, A Status Quo Bias: Behavioral Economics and 
the Federal Preliminary Injunction Standard, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1027 (2014). 
 69. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y. of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 368–69 (9th Cir.) stay 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (“Here, the injunction preserves the status quo prior to the 
recent legislative action in H.B. 2023. . . . So, the injunction in this case does not involve any 
disruption to Arizona’s long standing election procedures. To the contrary, it restores the status 
quo ante to the disruption created by the Arizona legislature that is affecting this election cycle 
for the first time.” (emphasis in original)).  
 70. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 669 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(“Of particular significance here, the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction 
maintained the status quo in Michigan that was in place for 125 years . . . .”).  
 71. See infra Section IV.A. 
 72. See supra Section II.B. 
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justification may not be as persuasive. For instance, the Purcell principle stands for 
the proposition that courts should avoid changing the enforcement of election laws—
suspending their enforcement or reinstituting them—shortly before an election.73 The 
Court there explained that “just weeks before an election,” the “issuance or 
nonissuance of an injunction” in cases “affecting elections” could cause “voter 
confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”74 It has 
counseled against changes to the status quo, whether in the issuance or nonissuance 
of an injunction.75 
While the Democracy Ratchet might lean toward constraining the power of the 
legislature, the Purcell principle might permit such laws to take effect, at least for 
one election, when courts lack sufficient time to address the merits of a claim before 
the election. The Democracy Ratchet would traditionally favor a plaintiff seeking to 
maintain the status quo, but Purcell looks to maintain the status quo as it currently 
exists for voters to avoid uncertainty. The status quo, then, is a less persuasive reason 
for the Democracy Ratchet—at least as long as Purcell remains good (if 
undertheorized)76 law from the Supreme Court. 
And this can only partially explain its use. While courts might cite a form of the 
Democracy Ratchet to justify preserving the status quo, they are also citing it when 
considering the underlying likelihood of the merits.77 The preliminary injunction 
standard may help explain the rise of the Democracy Ratchet—but only in part. 
III. REJECTING A SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY RATCHET 
These are reasons why the Democracy Ratchet has gained some attention—driven 
by litigants to preserve the status quo. But does the law compel such a result? Recall 
that courts and litigants employ the Democracy Ratchet regardless of the substantive 
legal theory advanced in the underlying litigation—it transcends any particular cause 
of action.78 
Litigants who go to federal court to challenge a law affecting voting rights have a 
variety of legal claims at their disposal. Three of the more popular routes to challenge 
a law are a Voting Rights Act claim, a freedom of association claim under the 
Burdick balancing test, and an Equal Protection claim after Bush v. Gore. Each claim 
has its own winding history. This Part examines each in turn and concludes that none 
of these legal theories includes the Democracy Ratchet as a part of its substantive 
legal framework. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 
(2016). 
 74. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006). 
 75. See Hasen, supra note 73, at 447–56 (collecting cases from Ohio, North Carolina, 
Wisconsin, and Texas). 
 76. See id. at 428. 
 77. See supra Part I. 
 78. See supra Part I. 
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A. The Voting Rights Act 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to protect the right to vote, 
particularly in jurisdictions in the South that had subjected minority voters to 
suppression tactics, which yielded substantial disparities between white and black 
voter registration and turnout.79 Understanding the current framework for 
adjudicating claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act begins with an 
understanding of Section 5, and of the Voting Rights Act generally. Through this 
history is a story of the Democracy Ratchet in Voting Rights Act litigation, including 
its demise and its subsequent reintroduction. 
1. The Demise of Section 5 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to “banish the blight of racial 
discrimination in voting,” in the words of the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach.80 Among other things, Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
established a preclearance regime for proposed changes to certain states’ voting laws: 
Section 4(b) created a formula for coverage, and Section 5 created the remedy.81 
States and other political subdivisions would be subject to preclearance from the 
Department of Justice (or a federal court) for election laws if they were identified as 
a “covered” jurisdiction; no election law could take effect without prior approval 
from the Department of Justice.82 
In 1965, covered jurisdictions had used a prohibited test or device (often a literacy 
test) and had less than fifty percent voter registration in November 1964 or less than 
fifty percent voter turnout in that year’s presidential election.83 The requirements of 
the Act mostly captured Southern states, including Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.84 
The preclearance regime was originally designed to expire after five years, but 
Congress renewed it repeatedly, most recently in 2006 and it is set to expire in 2031.85 
Congress included more jurisdictions subject to coverage in 1970 based on 
benchmarks in November 1968, and in 1975 based on benchmarks in November 
1972.86 But the coverage formula was not wholly static.87 A covered jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. Portions of this Section have been adapted from Derek T. Muller, Judicial Review of 
Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County v. Holder, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287 
(2013) [hereinafter Muller, Judicial Review]. 
 80. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 81. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 
10303(b), 10304 (2012 & Supp. 2017)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 84. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www 
.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/MFG7-FD4T] [hereinafter 
Section 4]. 
 85. Pub. L. 109-246, 120 Stat. 580 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10102 (2012 & Supp. 
2017)). 
 86. Section 4, supra note 84. 
 87. See Justin Levitt, Section 5 as Simulacrum, YALE L.J. ONLINE (2013), http://www.yale 
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could petition for “bailout” under the Act, so that individual jurisdictions could move 
out from under the coverage formula if they had established that preclearance was 
unnecessary.88 And a political jurisdiction could be subject to “bail-in,” facing a kind 
of judicially supervised preclearance if a federal court found that the jurisdiction 
acted with intentional racial discrimination.89 
While Section 5 originally may have plausibly been interpreted to extend a 
preclearance requirement only to changes in voter qualifications or the manner of 
elections,90 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 broadly. It included essentially 
all election-related laws as subject to preclearance—to cite a few, changes 
concerning single-member and at-large districts, write-in ballots, and independent 
candidacies;91 changes to polling locations and boundary lines;92 and reorganization 
of voting districts and the creation of multimember districts to replace single-member 
districts.93 Given the sheer breadth of Section 5, there were over half a million 
election-related changes in covered jurisdictions,94 but there have been a “trivial 
number of objections” from the Department of Justice concerning these changes, 
particularly since the 1982 renewal.95 
For a new law to pass scrutiny under Section 5, the jurisdiction bears the burden 
of proving that the law does not have a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory 
effect.96 The Supreme Court construed this provision as a doctrine of “non-
retrogression,” asking whether a change to voting procedures “would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise.”97 Non-retrogression offered a fairly clear 
benchmark: changes to the law should be compared against the previous state of the 
law. But it offered its own weaknesses as a limited test for those who believed that 
Section 5 might extend to more than just non-retrogression.98 
Section 5, of course, only extended to covered jurisdictions. And in 2013, the 
Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder concluded that the coverage formula, 
which had not been legislatively updated since 1975, was unconstitutional.99 That 
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 88. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 89. See 52 U.S.C. § 10302 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 90. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 582–94 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 91. See id. at 550–55. 
 92. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). 
 93. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). 
 94. Section 5 Changes by Type and Year, DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www 
.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/changes.php [https://perma.cc/FX7P-87KU] (identifying 
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FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 91 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). 
 96. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 97. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
 98. Cf. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 5, at 1214–15 (“As used in the Voting Rights Act, 
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 99. 570 U.S. 529, 549 (2013); see generally Muller, Judicial Review, supra note 79, at 
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left litigants who sought to challenge election laws scrambling to fill the void left by 
Shelby County. In addition, litigants sought opportunities to challenge election laws 
in jurisdictions that had not been covered by Section 5. 
2. The Rise of Section 2 
Following the demise of Section 5, proposals arose for a more robust use of 
Section 2.100 Indeed, even before Shelby County, Professor Dan Tokaji was an early 
proponent of using Section 2 for “new” vote denial claims—the kind of laws that 
burden voting practices or procedures in the form of “nuts and bolts” election laws—
with a two-part test101: “(1) that the practice challenged results in the disproportionate 
denial of minority votes (i.e., that it has a disparate impact on minority voters); and 
(2) that this disparate impact is traceable to the challenged practice’s interaction with 
social and historical conditions.”102 The burden would then shift to the state to justify 
that the practice is “narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest”; and that 
slight or de minimis burdens might be justified with something greater than mere 
rationality.103 
The contemporary version of Section 2 begins with the Supreme Court’s voting 
rights jurisprudence under the Reconstruction Amendments. Until 1982, Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act largely mirrored the guarantees of the Fifteenth 
Amendment104 and was ultimately treated as having “an effect no different from that 
of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”105 
In 1973, the Supreme Court in White v. Regester found that plaintiffs could 
successfully challenge a state redistricting plan under the Equal Protection Clause, 
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accompanying text. 
 102. Tokaji, New Vote Denial, supra note 101, at 724. 
 103. Id. at 725–26. 
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vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
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procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”). 
 105. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980). 
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even without a finding of discriminatory intent.106 But in 1980, in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, a plurality of the Court found that the Fifteenth Amendment covers laws 
“only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”107 It concluded that White v. 
Regester was consistent with the need to find a “discriminatory purpose” for striking 
down a law.108 And because Section 2 added nothing to the Fifteenth Amendment, 
the plaintiff’s claim failed there too.109 
Significantly, Congress’s 1982 amendments to the Act codified a results test, 
which specified that intent was not required, a response to Supreme Court 
precedent.110 The amended text of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides: 
A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, 
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation 
by members of a [protected class] in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.111 
Congress specifically cited White v. Regester as the source of this results test to 
overturn City of Mobile and bring Section 2 jurisprudence back to its earlier 
standing.112 Thus, “[t]he ‘right’ question . . . is whether ‘as a result of the challenged 
practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the 
political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.’”113 But the renewed 
results test itself was not abundantly clear:114 which circumstances should courts 
consider in the “totality,” by what standard should courts view the circumstances, 
and what did it mean for an electoral arrangement to result in members of a racial 
group having less of an opportunity to participate in the political process?115 
Courts would adopt the “Senate factors” to evaluate the “totality of the 
circumstances.”116 The factors derive from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (requiring plaintiffs to show that political processes “were 
not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less 
opportunity”). 
 107. 446 U.S. at 61–62, 69 (plurality opinion) (quoting White, 412 U.S. at 765) (“The Court 
stated the constitutional question in White to be whether the ‘multimember districts [were] 
being used invidiously . . . .’” (emphasis in original)).  
 108. Id. at 68–70. 
 109. See id. 
 110. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, 
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 387 (2012) 
[hereinafter Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2]. 
 113. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28 
(1982)). 
 114. One court called it “exceptionally vague.” Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, 
supra note 112, at 387 (citing Goosby v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 500 (2d Cir. 
1999) (Leval, J., concurring)). 
 115. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 112, at 387–88. 
 116. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43 n.7, 46. 
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majority report on the 1982 amendments to Section 2, with reference to the Supreme 
Court precedent. The factors include: 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to 
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large 
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or 
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for 
discrimination against the minority group; 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority 
group have been denied access to that process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political 
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively 
in the political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle 
racial appeals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to 
public office in the jurisdiction.117 
According to the Senate Report, courts should consider two other factors of 
“probative value”: whether “there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part 
of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group,” 
and whether the justification for the election practice or procedure is “tenuous.”118 
Professor Ellen Katz identified what might qualify as a tenth factor, a proportionality 
analysis in redistricting cases.119 
In the vote dilution context, the Supreme Court adopted a three-prong test in 
Thornburg v. Gingles.120 Vote dilution claims arise when minority voters allege that 
their votes have been diluted in a multimember district or at-large voting system, or 
because existing district lines dilute their votes across districts. The Court explained, 
“[t]he essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or 
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the 
[voting] opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982). 
 118. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37. 
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representatives.”121 The Court ratified consideration of the Senate Report factors, but 
it refined the judicial analysis for vote dilution claims.122 
To succeed, claimants must demonstrate three things. First, the voters challenging 
the district must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority”; second, the minority voters must be “politically cohesive”; third, the 
group must demonstrate that the “white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable 
it—in the absence of special circumstances . . . usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”123 If they can demonstrate these things, the jurisdiction must 
establish a district in which those minority voters constitute a majority of the voting 
age population.124 Vote dilution claims under Gingles have been fairly well-
established in the last few decades of redistricting, albeit not without controversy that 
Gingles went too far or failed to go far enough.125 
Vote denial claims, however, are another matter. Litigants rarely raised vote 
denial claims before Shelby County v. Holder, and these claims are still rarely 
successful.126 But federal appellate courts quickly adopted a two-prong test for vote 
denial claims under Section 2. To quote one typical judicial holding from 2014: 
 We read the text of Section 2 and the limited relevant case law as 
requiring proof of two elements for a vote denial claim. First, as the text 
of Section 2(b) indicates, the challenged “standard, practice, or 
procedure” must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a 
protected class, meaning that members of the protected class “have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Second, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that that burden must in part be caused by 
or linked to “social and historical conditions” that have or currently 
produce discrimination against members of the protected class. In 
assessing both elements, courts should consider “the totality of 
circumstances.”127 
Federal courts rapidly adopted this two-part articulation of the test.128 But the 
devil is in the details of the “totality of the circumstances.” The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Ninth Circuits have been inclined to adopt the Gingles factors to determine the 
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effect of a law in the vote denial context.129 The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has been 
“skeptical” of using the Gingles factors.130 Nonetheless, courts had adapted some 
version of Section 2 jurisprudence to examine under the “totality of the 
circumstances” whether members of a protected class have “less opportunity”131 than 
others. 
3. Distinguishing Section 2 and Section 5 
Even though Section 2 and Section 5 are both parts of the Voting Rights Act, they 
have significantly different procedural and substantive differences.132 The Supreme 
Court has been careful not to conflate Section 2 and Section 5. In its first Reno v. 
Bossier Parish School Board decision, the Court held that Section 5’s non-
retrogression standard was distinct from Section 2.133 Preclearance should not be 
denied simply because of a violation of Section 2.134 Non-retrogression compares the 
“benchmark” of the previous plan to the new practice; there is no such benchmark 
needed to succeed under Section 2.135 
The Court has also distinguished Section 2 and Section 5 to suggest that non-
retrogression is exclusive to Section 5—at least, the Court so suggested in vote 
dilution cases. In Holder v. Hall, the Court explained, benchmarks to evaluate 
Section 5 claims are easy: “We require preclearance of changes in size under § 5, 
because in a § 5 case the question of an alternative benchmark never arises—the 
benchmark is simply the former practice employed by the jurisdiction seeking 
approval of a change.”136 “The baseline for comparison is present by definition; it is 
the existing status.”137 “Retrogression is not the inquiry in § 2 dilution cases.”138 And 
the Court cited Congress in this respect: “Plaintiffs could not establish a Section 2 
violation merely by showing that a challenged reapportionment or annexation, for 
example, involved a retrogressive effect on the political strength of a minority 
group.”139 In a Section 2 challenge to the size of a government body, “[t]here is no 
principled reason why one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for 
comparison.”140 
Other courts have followed suit, refusing to import non-retrogression into Section 
2.141 Indeed, sometimes plaintiffs have prevailed on a Section 2 claim on a law that 
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had been precleared.142 At other times, however, courts have read a Section 5 gloss 
into Section 2 claims,143 sometimes implicitly.144 
4. Section 2 and the Democracy Ratchet 
The demise of Section 5 and new litigation surrounding vote denial claims 
launched not just attention on Section 2, but attention focused on how to treat 
changes to laws. That is, when the legislature eliminates a previously available 
voting practice or procedure, how should a court scrutinize the new law? 
Professor Tokaji’s approach to Section 2 vote denial claims is a three-part test that 
resembles, in part, the judicial test:  
(1)  Plaintiffs must show that the challenged standard, practice, or 
procedure causes a disproportionate burden on members of a 
protected class that an alternative standard, practice, or procedure 
would avoid. 
(2)  Plaintiffs must show that the disproportionate burden is traceable to 
interaction of the challenged standard, practice, or procedure with 
“social and historical conditions” that have produced or currently 
produce discrimination against members of the protected class. 
(3)  If the plaintiffs satisfy (1) and (2) then the defendants must show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the burden on voting is 
outweighed by the state interests in the challenged standard, 
practice, or procedure.145  
When it comes to changes in laws, Professor Tokaji explains, “context matters a 
great deal.”146 Courts ought to examine “how the practice fits in (or does not fit in) 
with the body of election rules and practices in the state.”147 
As for changes to election laws, Professor Tokaji recommends that “the relevant 
question is whether the challenged practice has a disparate impact on racial 
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minorities relative to other voters that could be avoided by some other practice.”148 
If the practice affects white voters and minority voters in the same way, there is no 
disproportionate burden.149 
Professor Pamela Karlan has suggested that changes to voting laws should 
properly be considered a “burden” in a Section 2 claim—“[g]iving evidentiary 
weight to the existence of a change does not impermissibly import the retrogression 
standard of section 5 into section 2.”150 She persuasively argues that a racially 
disproportionate effect “cannot be necessary to establishing a section 2 violation,” in 
part because turnout data is unavailable until after the election, and that relief must 
be available before the election.151 She argues that “abridgment” may include any 
practice with “‘less’ (and not ‘no’) opportunity to participate equally.”152 Where 
voters “disproportionately” use a particular mechanism, such as voting on Sundays, 
cutbacks on that mechanisms will, “as a practical matter, disproportionately burden 
or abridge” the right to vote.153 “Abridgement” includes “overcoming new or 
different burdens.”154 To survive a Section 2 claim, a jurisdiction would need to 
demonstrate that it would have adopted the change to the voting law “in the absence 
of any political consequences,” which is likely “impossible” in most cases.155 
Professor Michael Pitts has proposed “rescuing retrogression” by offering an 
“additional layer” to the Section 2 test to specifically handle a “newly adopted 
law.”156 A law with a retrogressive effect would “presumptively” violate Section 2, 
and the burden shifts to the government “to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the retrogression in order to avoid section 2 liability.”157 
5. Section 2 Resists a Substantive Ratchet 
The text of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not necessarily support 
implementing the Democracy Ratchet—at least not in its stronger forms. 
To start, the text of Section 2 contains succinct language that ought to begin. A 
voting practice is forbidden if it is “not equally open to participation” so that 
members have “less opportunity than other members . . . to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.”158 It’s worth noting that this 
statutory language has been modified through some judicial interpretations in cases 
adopting the Democracy Ratchet. In the Ninth Circuit decision considering Arizona’s 
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ban on ballot harvesting, for instance, the court noted that the law places “a 
disproportionate burden on the voting opportunities of members of the Tohono 
O’odham tribe in comparison with the population of white voters.”159 The statutory 
language “less opportunity . . . to participate . . . and to elect” became 
“disproportionate burden on the voting opportunities” in the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding.160 
There is a risk in cases like these of over-reading the statute to conclude that any 
facially neutral practice that any group has ever used runs afoul of the language of 
Section 2.161 But perhaps that overstates the claim. It’s not that the voting practice or 
procedure has ever been used by a racial group. It’s that, as Professor Karlan notes, 
the practice or procedure—say, early voting or Sunday voting—has been 
“disproportionately” used by (in this case) black voters, and that a cutback on the 
practice or procedure would “disproportionately” burden black voters.162 That is, 
overcoming “new or different burdens” would qualify as “less opportunity.”163 But 
even here, the Court’s consistent rejection of importing a non-retrogression standard 
from Section 5 into Section 2 makes the introduction of the Democracy Ratchet 
problematic. And there is a constitutional concern too: if Section 2 is construed too 
broadly, it might exceed Congress’s powers under the Reconstruction 
Amendments.164 
Put another way, the text of the statute requires “less opportunity”—not “fewer 
opportunities.”165 The simple fact that voters have benefited from a mechanism in 
the past, and that mechanism no longer exists, cannot be enough. “Less opportunity” 
in the context of vote dilution includes a finding that the majority racial voting block 
votes “usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”166 Likewise, elimination 
of a voting mechanism—or the lack of a voting mechanism in a non-Democracy 
Ratchet context—that would work to “usually” defeat the minority’s ability “to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice” might 
rise to the level of a Section 2 violation.167 The abolition of a voting opportunity 
alone is not enough to assert “less opportunity.” 
Importing non-retrogression into Section 2 would also exacerbate the problem for 
states trying to justify election laws. With Section 5 preclearance, jurisdictions would 
go to the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel, with a fairly settled 
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expectation of what they needed to demonstrate out of the legislative process.168 
Reading non-retrogression into Section 2, however, the parties would head directly 
to court, before a single district court judge, with an ordinary litigation posture but 
an expectation that the defendant carries a heavier burden than has typically been 
required under Section 2 claims. 
Rethinking how Section 2 claims ought to look, then, there must necessarily be a 
“gap” left by the demise of Section 5. Some practices that constituted “retrogression” 
under Section 5 cannot constitute “less opportunity” under Section 2; otherwise, 
Section 2 would, at the very least, be coextensive with Section 5, and even broader 
given its national application. That would not only render Section 5 historically 
superfluous—an anachronistic take at best—but also contradict existing Court 
precedent on how to construe Section 2 differently from Section 5. It’s essentially 
the reverse of Reno v. Bossier: just as Section 2 standards cannot be imported into 
Section 5, Section 5 standards cannot be imported into Section 2.169 
So what kinds of practices might fail the non-retrogression standard but still pass 
muster under Section 2? It could be the case that this gap is somewhat narrow, or at 
least apparently narrow given the posture of the cases courts see. It may be that 
litigants are challenging the most egregious laws (but perhaps out of a preference for 
challenging the laws they consider, and perhaps subjectively, to be the most 
egregious—particularly statewide laws). It might be that more modest changes, some 
of which may have failed Section 5—the closing of certain polling place locations, 
for instance, unless the jurisdiction affirmatively demonstrated that the change would 
not have a retrogressive impact—are not so dramatic and have not garnered much 
attention from litigants. 
Recent proposals to use Section 2 to address changes to election laws are best 
when they avoid the peril of reading retrogression back into the statute. Changes to 
election laws remain a relevant part of the inquiry, but their relevance arises as a 
matter of evidence that can be introduced to demonstrate that minority voters have 
“less opportunity” than others. Put differently, the Democracy Ratchet is not a 
substantive component of Section 2. It is simply a means of demonstrating that, under 
the “totality of the circumstances,” the plaintiffs may win under Section 2—an 
evidentiary claim.170 
In contract, one suggests that incorporating the Democracy Ratchet into Section 
2 itself would provide this portion of the Voting Rights Act with a consistent standard 
operating within this broader legal framework. The legal standard is fairly open-
ended: “less opportunity,” for example, is hardly a term of precision. Courts, then, 
might look at the overall purpose of the statute in question and evaluate changes to 
election laws given a broader statutory framework. For instance, Professor Karlan 
has noted that because the Voting Rights Act is designed to ensure broad 
opportunities for voters to take advantage of election procedures and practices, the 
statute ought to be applied so that it best achieves these ends.171 The Democracy 
Ratchet would be one such tool to achieve those ends. 
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But this interpretation risks smuggling a Section 5 non-retrogression analysis back 
into the statute, something flatly forbidden.172 Furthermore, such an interpretation 
may overstate the “opportunities” available to voters under the status quo, inflate the 
burden placed upon them, and understate the costs of changing the law.173 The 
Democracy Ratchet may still play a role, but simply an evidentiary or remedial 
role—separate from the substantive elements of a Voting Rights Act claim.174 
6. Revisiting the Development of the Democracy Ratchet 
Finally, to return to the descriptive claim from earlier: why has the Democracy 
Ratchet attracted such attention in Section 2 claims? Undoubtedly, litigants question 
new election laws and challenge them in court, and courts have become skeptical of 
new election laws.175 Indeed, after Shelby County, it simply became easier for states 
to change their election laws—and many did so, to the consternation of those who 
endorsed a robust Section 5.176 After all, that was precisely what states could do. 
Commentators skeptical of Shelby County sought alternative ways to preserve the 
essential elements of Section 5 through not simply Section 2177 but existing law178 or 
new legislation.179 For supporters of Section 5 who lamented the Court’s decision in 
Shelby County, filling the gap left after Shelby County has been an understandably 
natural focus. But Shelby County still controls, and there is no preclearance under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act at the moment. Until Congress acts, it is simply 
the case that changes to election laws receive no kind of heighted judicial scrutiny 
under the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 does not demand it, no matter how much 
litigants and supporters of Section 5 may desire it. 
B. The Burdick Balancing Test 
Another major way for litigants to challenge election laws is under a test 
commonly known as the Burdick balancing test. It derives from a series of cases 
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involving the freedom of voters and candidates to associate with one another by 
means of the ballot. 
1. Voting and Association 
The First Amendment includes no express guarantee of the “freedom of 
association.”180 But in 1958, the Court examined an attempt by the Alabama Attorney 
General to force the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) to disclose its membership list.181 The Court concluded that the right 
asserted by members of the NAACP was a freedom of association: “It is beyond 
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas 
is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”182 By choosing to root 
the freedom of association in the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment,183 
the Court acknowledged “the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and 
assembly.”184 
The Court wasted no time in introducing the doctrine into ballot access disputes. 
By the 1960s, the Court had already begun to inject itself into traditionally state-
administered areas of election law.185 And ten years after NAACP v. Alabama, the 
Supreme Court found that the state-administered ballot included an associational 
right.186 In 1968, the Court examined a challenge to Ohio’s ballot access law.187 Ohio 
required presidential candidates nominated by new parties to secure voter-signed 
petitions totaling at least fifteen percent of the ballots cast in the previous 
gubernatorial election.188 Republican and Democratic candidates qualified for ballot 
space if their parties secured just ten percent.189 In its decision in Williams v. Rhodes, 
the Court identified “two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights—the right 
of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of 
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qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes 
effectively.”190 
Even if a candidate did not appear on the ballot, the Court acknowledged that 
individuals could associate for political purposes in the public sphere.191 They could 
organize a political party, they could hold meetings, and they could assemble in 
public places or private homes.192 But the Court did not limit the guarantee of 
association to these previously enumerated opportunities to engage in political 
speech. Alternative avenues of engagement existed, but they were insufficient. 
Instead, the Court extended the guarantee to include a right to associate in a particular 
forum: the ballot.193 The Court explained, “[t]he right to form a party for the 
advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election 
ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes.”194 This right of association 
is not effective enough unless it applies to the ballot, because alternative means of 
association are not enough.195 The right to cast an effective or meaningful ballot, 
then, is also an element of the freedom of association.196 
Like most other rights secured by the Constitution, the right of voters to associate 
with candidates on the ballot is not absolute. Circumstances may permit the state to 
regulate the ballot to burden individuals’ right to associate. In Rhodes, the Court 
found that there were “unequal burdens on minority groups where rights of this kind 
are at stake,” which meant that a burden-imposing state must proffer “a compelling 
state interest.”197 Ohio failed to justify the burden.198 Its proffered interests in 
burdening minor parties—promoting the stability of the two-party system, ensuring 
that winners earn a majority of the vote, and the like—were legitimate interests, but 
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they were not enough.199 The State could not “justify the very severe restrictions on 
voting and associational rights,” and its defense failed.200 
The Court considered a ballot access law again, three years later, in Jenness v. 
Fortson.201 There, a Georgia law permitted ballot access for an independent 
candidate if the candidate had a petition signed by at least five percent of registered 
voters.202 Political parties whose candidates received at least twenty percent of the 
vote would automatically qualify for ballot access.203 
So far as the Georgia election laws [were] concerned, independent 
candidates and members of small or newly formed political organizations 
[were] wholly free to associate, to proselytize, to speak, to write, and to 
organize campaigns for any school of thought they wish[ed]. They may 
[have chosen to] confine themselves to an appeal for write-in votes. Or 
they [might have sought], over a six months’ period, the signatures of 
5% of the eligible electorate . . . . If they [chose] the latter course, the 
[path to ballot access was open to them].204 
The Court concluded that “nothing” in this system “abridges the rights of free speech 
and association secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”205 Then it 
rejected a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.206 
Since Rhodes and Jenness, the Court’s opinions have emphasized the voters’ 
rights to associate with candidates—voters’ rights to associate for political ends or 
to choose among candidates.207 The Court’s examinations turn primarily on rights of 
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voters to associate with these candidates and cast a ballot for the candidate of their 
choice.208 
2. Balancing Tests 
These early ballot access disputes ultimately led the Court to develop the 
balancing test that dominates election administration litigation today. A leading case 
in the area is Anderson v. Celebrezze.209 There, the Court scrutinized an Ohio law 
that required independent candidates running for president to file a nomination 
petition and statement of candidacy the March before the November election.210 The 
Court determined that the appropriate test required “weighing” a series of factors.211 
These included the “character and magnitude” of the injury to the constitutional 
rights at issue, the interests of the state in creating the burdens that impact those 
constitutional rights, and the extent to which the burdens are necessary to achieve the 
state’s interests.212 It then concluded that the March filing deadline did not further 
the state’s proffered interests: educating voters, treating parties equally, and political 
stability.213 
In Burdick v. Takushi, the Supreme Court examined a challenge to Hawaii’s write-
in candidate prohibition.214 It articulated a fuller explanation of the Anderson 
balancing test as follows: 
 A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh 
“the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into 
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff’s rights.” 
 Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety 
of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged 
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we 
have recognized when those rights are subjected to “severe” restrictions, 
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 209. 460 U.S. at 780. 
 210. Id. at 782–83. 
 211. Id. at 789. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 796–806. 
 214. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
2019] THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET  479 
 
the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.” But when a state election law provision 
imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions.215 
Restated, a court must identify the “character and magnitude” of the injury based 
on the state’s proffered “precise interests” and the “extent” of the “burden” on the 
plaintiff.216 In practice, after an examination of the facts, the court tends to make a 
rather conclusory statement about the nature of the injury. A court’s characterization 
of the character and magnitude of the law—as “severe” or “reasonable [and] 
nondiscriminatory”—triggers the level of appropriate scrutiny.217 “Severe” burdens 
must be “narrowly drawn” to achieve a “compelling interest.”218 But a “reasonable 
[and] nondiscriminatory” burden “generally” survives judicial scrutiny pursuant to 
the state’s “important regulatory interests.”219 
Burdick involved a challenge to Hawaii’s ban on counting write-in votes.220 The 
Court concluded that “any” burden imposed was a “very limited” one because 
candidates had ample opportunities to obtain ballot access.221 That meant Hawaii’s 
law easily passed constitutional scrutiny.222 
But Burdick would offer a framework that could be applied to far more election 
law situations than ballot access disputes. It is, admittedly, an ad hoc and open-ended 
test.223 And it would extend to election administration cases more generally. The 
ballot access disputes in Anderson and Burdick would offer a kind of safety valve for 
federal courts to scrutinize state election laws. And the introduction of the Burdick 
framework into “nuts and bolts” election administration cases has not proved as 
smooth. 
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court considered a 
challenge to Indiana’s voter identification law and used the Burdick balancing test.224 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. Id. at 434 (citations omitted). 
 216. “‘Character’ references the type of burden the State places on voters . . . . ‘Magnitude’ 
references the severity of the State’s burden on voters.” Michael J. Gabrail, Misapplication: 
The Rush to Equal Protection and How the Lower Courts Have Misapplied the “Character and 
Magnitude” Analysis to Equal Protection Claims Against Election Law 6 (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 217. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. 
L. REV. 89, 97 (2014). 
 220. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428. 
 221. Id. at 435–37. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 282–83, 297 (2015) 
(arguing that the Anderson-Burdick test is too subjective and ad hoc and recommending a more 
objective approach to identifying violations of the right to vote rooted in Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 224. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
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The plurality characterized the law as “a limited burden on voters’ rights”225 and the 
concurrence described it as a “generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting 
regulation.”226 Unsurprisingly, then, Indiana’s law was justified by at least three 
“legitimate” interests: modernizing elections, preventing voter fraud, and 
safeguarding voter confidence.227 
The “balancing” test often functions as a simple binary formula. If the burden is 
severe, it must pass strict scrutiny; if the burden is slight, it must pass something like 
rational basis scrutiny.228 As a relatively binary formula, it often yields a binary 
result: if the legislative burden is severe, it is usually deemed a violation of the right 
to associate; if it is not severe, the regulation is typically upheld.229 
Often, but not always. Crawford offered at least two major opportunities for 
increased judicial scrutiny of such laws. First, the Crawford three-Justice plurality 
suggested that the proper measure for evaluating the burden of election laws should 
be to examine the burden placed upon the affected group.230 In Crawford, that meant 
examining the “small number of voters” who may experience a “special burden.”231 
The record demonstrated no “‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class 
of voters.”232 Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment with two other Justices and 
argued that the Court precedent demanded that the Justices examine a “generally 
applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation” from the perspective of “voters 
generally,” not a particularized group of voters.233 
Second, the Crawford plurality offered not so much a binary formula, but a 
“flexible standard” that required some evaluation of the nature of the burden.234 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment to dispute this claim, arguing that a “two-
track” approach was appropriate and more consistent with the Court’s precedents.235 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. Id. at 202–03 (plurality opinion) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439). 
 226. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 227. Id. at 191–97 (plurality opinion). 
 228. See id. at 204–06 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 229. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter 
Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 207–10 (2015) (discussing courts’ 
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 230. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191. 
 231. Id. at 200. 
 232. Id. at 202 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)). 
 233. Id. at 205–08 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 234. Id. at 190 n.8 (plurality opinion); see also Justin Levitt, Crawford—More Rhetorical 
Bark than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 2, 2008), http://www.brennancenter 
.org/blog/crawford-more-rhetorical-bark-legal-bite [https://perma.cc/Y6R7-N34M]. 
 235. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205–06 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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By permitting courts to focus exclusively on the group burdened, Crawford 
increased the likelihood that a generally applicable voting regulation would be found 
excessively burdensome. After all, if the law only directly impacts a subset of the 
voting population, the burdens placed upon that subset are likely to be greater when 
considered in isolation than when considered across all voters generally. This, of 
course, was of cold comfort to the plaintiffs in Crawford, who failed to garner 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they had been meaningfully burdened, and 
because the state’s fairly generic interests were sufficient to sustain the voter 
identification law.236 
3. The Democracy Ratchet and Balancing Tests 
The Burdick balancing test, as applied in election administration cases in 
Crawford, may well have a component that resembles the Democracy Ratchet.237 
When considering the “burden” placed upon voters, courts do not evaluate claims in 
a vacuum. They are considering the evidence of the things prospective voters must 
do before they can vote. 
Crawford presents some major opportunities for prospective litigants. First, like 
challenges under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs can demonstrate they 
are members of a disproportionately affected group, like the group who lacked proper 
voter identification established in Crawford. For a group that previously took 
advantage of an opportunity no longer available to it because of a change to the 
election law, that group can point to the language from Crawford that identifies the 
group as the appropriate place to begin an analysis of the Burdick balancing.238 
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 237. I am grateful to several commenters who wondered whether the right to vote as a 
“fundamental right” meant that the Democracy Ratchet may have greater salience. I am 
reluctant to conclude so. The typical “fundamental” right to vote cases have had the greatest 
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Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1865 (2013). 
 238. The plurality’s decision in Crawford assuredly does not have binding precedential 
value. Six Justices agreed that the proper measure of a burden was on the affected group. See 
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197, 200–03 (plurality opinion); id. at 211–14 (Souter, J., dissenting); 
id. at 238–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But this holding was not essential to the opinion. The 
essential element of the opinion was affirming that the voter identification law was not 
sufficiently burdensome, whether the burden was measured via a subset of voters, see id. at 
203 (plurality opinion), or measured via voters generally, see id. at 205–07 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). That is not to say that some courts have not quickly embraced 
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Second, plaintiffs have more opportunities to demonstrate the burdens placed 
upon them by the “flexible standard” theory of burden. Changes to election laws are 
often less onerous than a strict photo identification law like the one adopted in 
Crawford,239 which would generally put claimants in a “less onerous” category of 
laws, if not the “slight” burden from the Burdick test. A flexible standard, however, 
provides a greater opportunity to persuade a court that the law impermissibly burdens 
a group of voters. 
Third, with a comparative benchmark, courts can look to past practice to 
determine the substantiality of the burden. The more people affected by the law, the 
greater the impact. The record in a case like Crawford was fairly sparse because the 
law had not yet been implemented, and the Court was forced largely to speculate 
about the potential burden the identification law would place on voters. In contrast, 
a change to an existing law offers more ready evidence for plaintiffs to present about 
the burdens they face with the loss of a pre-existing voting practice or procedure. 
These are all reasons why litigants might have certain advantages in raising claims 
under the Democracy Ratchet. But they do not necessarily mean that the Burdick 
balancing test itself embraces a Democracy Ratchet as a substantive element of the 
claim. Indeed, Burdick, as used in Crawford, and the practice of the Court in similar 
balancing cases, has not done so. And other federal courts in the voter identification 
context suggest that the change in the law is not the essential touchstone—or even 
something to consider. Voter identification laws, as the Crawford plurality noted, 
inevitably “inconvenience” a set of voters, and undoubtedly place a “burden” upon 
them. But courts considering voter identification laws seldom consider the burdens 
on voters before and after the identification law has been implemented. Instead, they 
simply evaluate the nature of the burden placed upon voters in the context of what 
they believe to be acceptable, based on the demonstrated record before them.240 
Another complication is that the Burdick balancing test was originally developed 
as a kind of safety valve for ballot access laws that blocked minor party political 
candidates. It may not be as well-suited for the sprawling election law claims that 
they’ve been used for in the last few decades.241 That said, the Burdick balancing test 
for ballot access cases has long resisted incorporating a ratchet. The series of cases 
discussed above—Rhodes, Jenness, Anderson, and Burdick—each focus exclusively 
on the impact of the new law, not a comparison of the new law against the old law.242 
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C. Other Causes of Action 
The Voting Rights Act and the Burdick balancing test are the two most popular 
causes of action that invoke the Democracy Ratchet. But other causes of action, 
including a Bush v. Gore-style challenge, are possible sources of challenges. 
Courts have occasionally invoked the equal protection claim in Bush v. Gore243 
when considering election law-related litigation. I hesitate even to raise Bush v. Gore. 
First, one must address the threshold inquiry of whether Bush v. Gore stands for any 
broader proposition beyond Florida’s presidential election controversy in 2000.244 
Given that the Supreme Court has never cited it in any case in the ensuing eighteen 
years except once in a dissenting opinion for a proposition unrelated to its core 
holding,245 one might wonder whether it has any applicability in election law cases 
going forward.246 
But the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore did turn on an equal protection issue. 
The Court found that the Florida Supreme Court failed to adopt uniformity in a 
statewide recount, lacking “some assurance that the rudimentary requirement of 
equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.”247 A recount based on ad 
hoc, county-based recount standards yielded an “arbitrary and disparate treatment to 
voters in different counties.”248 
The Ohio early voting case expanded this proposition significantly. First, it 
applied Bush v. Gore in a case concerning a “burden[] on the fundamental right to 
vote” rather than disparate treatment of ballots in a recount.249 Additionally, Bush v. 
Gore was concerned with disparate treatment after Election Day in the context of 
that very election—a new change to the recount procedures, adopted after Election 
Day and during a recount that had a disparate treatment of different ballots.250 
The Sixth Circuit extended that holding in a somewhat dubious direction: 
Moreover, while Bush v. Gore did involve disparate treatment, rather 
than burdens on the fundamental right to vote, we nonetheless find its 
motivating principle instructive in the present case given that the Equal 
Protection Clause can be triggered by either disparate treatment or 
burdens. That is, “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal 
terms”—such as expanding early voting opportunities—“the State may 
not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 244. See id. 
 245. See Arizona v. InterTribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 35 n.2 (Thomas, J., 
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over that of another”—for example, by making it substantially harder for 
certain groups to vote than others.251  
But this cannot be the case. Not every subsequent change to any election law, 
particularly to laws that would prospectively apply in subsequent elections, runs 
afoul of the equal protection principle in Bush v. Gore. Extending the case from 
disparate treatment to voter burdens is one thing. But extending it from a change in 
treatment in a single election to a change in treatment across elections is far more 
attenuated. It may also be a reason few courts have followed suit to broaden the scope 
of application of Bush v. Gore.252 
IV. AN EVIDENTIARY AND REMEDIAL DEMOCRACY RATCHET 
Litigants, and courts, have begun to adopt the Democracy Ratchet. But, as this 
Article has demonstrated, there are good reasons to doubt that any of the major 
federal causes of action in election law disputes embrace the Democracy Ratchet.253 
That there are reasons to explain the use of the Democracy Ratchet, or to offer some 
basis for tying it to existing legal standards, hardly means that the Democracy 
Ratchet is the right tool for courts to use. Therefore, what role (if any) for the 
Democracy Ratchet? 
This Article offers a modest role for the Democracy Ratchet as an evidentiary 
device and a readily available remedy. First, courts still face difficulties assessing the 
impact of changes to election laws. They also lack sufficient quantitative evidence to 
address the merits of these underlying disputes. And they lack judicially manageable 
benchmarks to examine these claims. These all point toward using the Democracy 
Ratchet as a useful evidentiary device, a judicially administrable benchmark, and a 
readily available remedy. 
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A. Difficulty Assessing the Likely Impact of a Law 
Courts regularly grapple with how to measure the impact of a voting practice 
under these substantive legal standards. Courts must generally do their best to 
evaluate the prospective impact of a law, hardly a challenge unique to the election 
law context. But many judicial struggles likely arise from the fact that the right to 
vote, as a political right, never received the kind of judicial protection that today’s 
contemporary causes of action provided. 
Historically, if one were denied the right to vote, one could sue for damages.254 
The writ quo warranto permitted an election challenger to sue the certified winner 
and claim a right to the seat.255 Another remedy might exist in legislatures, both in 
Congress and in the states, which have the power to judge the “Elections, Returns 
and Qualifications” of its members.256 
But courts, beginning in the 1960s and particularly after Baker v. Carr,257 
increasingly found themselves fashioning remedies to protect the right to vote. 
Congress’s mandate under the Voting Rights Act required courts to assess the 
burdens that changes to election laws might have on racial minorities.258 The broad 
judicial development of the freedom of association continue to inject the federal 
courts into reviewing the mechanics of elections.259 And Bush v. Gore invited courts 
to review even the “nuts and bolts” of election administration.260 Courts, now tasked 
with these new legal responsibilities, began to fashion rules to help them adjudicate 
whether the facts surrounding an election law-related controversy would permit 
plaintiffs to succeed. 
General evidentiary principles arose in these cases. In vote dilution claims under 
Section 2, the Supreme Court emphasized that results from several elections are more 
probative than a single election.261 A single election might be an outlier—particularly 
a midterm election.262 A change to an existing set of election laws, then, offers courts 
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the benefit of looking back at past practice and evaluating the actual number of times 
voters took advantage of a previously available election law-related opportunity. 
Accordingly, in voter identification litigation, courts have sometimes struggled to 
evaluate predictions of future voting behavior and the effect a law may have on 
turnout. In voter identification litigation before the Seventh Circuit, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook explained, “the parties and the district court have tried to make 
predictions about the effects of requiring photo ID, but the predictions cannot be 
compared with results.”263 Voter identification litigation, therefore, might typically 
explore the projected number of eligible or registered voters who lack the proper 
identification, which, in the view of courts evaluating such laws, has been the way 
to engage in prospective assessment.264 Indeed, this is precisely the approach taken 
in Crawford.265 
B. Insufficient Quantitative Evidence 
There are challenges in evaluating changes to election laws. What, then, should 
courts do when confronting litigation with a lack of quantitative evidence? Courts 
cannot measure whether turnout has changed until after an election (and even then, 
isolating causes can still be a challenge). Nevertheless, they do their best to address 
the law with the evidentiary record before them, even if it involves some speculation. 
The Ninth Circuit identified this precise problem when assessing Arizona’s ballot 
harvesting law.266 
When invoking the Democracy Ratchet, proponents may be quick to note that 
quantitative evidence is not necessary to succeed on the substantive underlying legal 
claim. Consider the “totality of the circumstances” test for Section 2.267 Professor 
Karlan notes that measuring the turnout effects of a law can be “extraordinarily 
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and analyze quantitative data before an election.”). 
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complex,” emphasizing that such quantitative evidence “are not a necessary 
precondition” under Section 2.268 
Such mathematical demonstrations of proof have not been required in vote denial 
cases under Section 2 and, more specifically, under Democracy Ratchet cases. And 
this is an uncontroversial proposition in Section 2 claims. Professor Tokaji has 
emphasized that “context” matters when considering changes to election laws.269 As 
he has argued, “Where a state goes from a more permissive voting rule to a stricter 
one, plaintiffs will naturally be in a better position to show that the disparate impact 
could be avoided by a different practice: namely, by introducing evidence on the 
effect of the practice in effect beforehand.”270 And Professor Karlan has emphasized 
that changes to election laws should carry some “evidentiary weight.”271 It is useful 
evidence, to be sure—and far from a quantitative evidentiary requirement. 
C. Lack of Superior Alternative Judicially-Manageable Benchmarks 
Even if there is little quantitative evidence, courts still must determine whether a 
state’s law impermissibly burdens voters. Indeed, courts often lack quantitative 
evidence. Courts must turn to other measures to determine whether, and how much, 
a law burdens voters. And it may be the case that courts and litigants simply lack 
superior alternative benchmarks for measuring the burden placed on the right to vote, 
or that they are unwilling to posit alternative benchmarks. That is, it may be the case 
that the very best evidence at judges’ disposal is to compare the new law against the 
old law and engage in an analysis about the relative change in burden. 
Courts have been willing to inject themselves into disputes concerning the right 
to vote, and they have readily assessed burdens placed upon that right with a 
judicially developed standard, but one often readily easy to administer. Consider 
“one person, one vote,” a judicial doctrine arising out of the redistricting litigation of 
the 1960s.272 The Court’s requirement in Reynolds v. Sims that districts include equal 
population did not include much guidance about what equal meant.273 Over the last 
sixty years, the Court has ultimately settled that deviations of up to ten percent 
between the most populous and least populous districts in a state legislative system 
are usually permissible,274 although larger deviations have been considered 
acceptable.275 In congressional restricting, the Court has typically required something 
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close to precise mathematical equality.276 These have provided fairly administrable 
benchmarks for judicial review. 
Or consider the judicial determination that a new majority-minority district ought 
to be drawn pursuant to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.277 There have been 
mathematical rules—with some precision—required for a plaintiff to succeed on a 
vote dilution claim under Section 2. Consider Thornburg v. Gingles, which 
established the “necessary preconditions” for minority voters as a group to establish 
a single-member district.278 Faced with the generic language of Section 2, the Court 
developed a test to determine whether a group has “less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.”279 This Article addressed the contours of this test 
earlier.280 The group must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority,”281 which has meant a voting population exceeding fifty 
percent,282 and a geographic compactness that has precluded a district with a “300-
mile gap” between racial minority communities.283 The group must demonstrate that 
it is “politically cohesive,”284 where, for instance, “anywhere from 49% to 67% of 
the members of a minority group preferred the same candidate.”285 And the group 
must demonstrate that the “white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—
in the absence of special circumstances, . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred 
candidate.”286 The Court was comfortable requiring some history of support before 
moving ahead under a typical Section 2 vote dilution claim. 
Or consider the whole line of ballot access cases, where a court makes a judgment 
that a particular signature requirement is or is not unduly burdensome.287 Courts look 
to the objective burdens placed upon independent and minor-party candidates, not 
the relative change in burden.288 
Just because courts are willing (or, in the case of the Voting Rights Act, mandated 
by Congress) to enter the political fray, does not necessarily mean remedies are so 
easily available. Having entered the thicket, courts have been more reluctant to 
fashion remedies that stray too far from a couple of hallmarks: readily available 
evidence that judges can evaluate, and remedial actions grounded in something 
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tethered to that evidence. Past voting behavior and other readily discernible evidence 
are valuable to courts in election law cases. 
Perhaps, too, there are worries about courts developing their own standards in 
areas where they lack guidance, either because the statute is open-ended or they are 
applying a test derived from a construction of the Constitution. And in this respect, 
the Democracy Ratchet has the emphatic virtue of the ease of administration.289 It 
allows judges to perform a smaller task: they simply compare the old standard to the 
new standard, without referring to any other more abstract standard about what the 
“right to vote” looks like. 
The legal standards from the Court are notoriously uncertain, anyway. For the 
Burdick balancing test, when is a burden on the right “slight,” “substantial,” or 
“severe”? Section 2’s “totality of the circumstances” includes a laundry list of factors 
from a Senate report and a fairly substantial amount of judicial discretion. Professor 
Christopher Elmendorf has even gone so far as to call Section 2 a common law grant 
of power to federal courts.290 
A comparison of the burdens between the old law and the new law provides an 
anchor for judges, litigants, and legislatures. And the change of law does seem to be 
a relevant factor—new laws should be examined in context. And while this factor 
may blend in with the absence of evidence,291 it’s really a factor closer to judicial 
administration. 
D. A Remedial Ratchet 
Finally, the Democracy Ratchet offers courts a benefit beyond its evidentiary 
function. It provides courts with a readily available remedy—the existing standard. 
If a new law is found to impermissibly lessen opportunities for voters or 
inappropriately burden voters, a court must fashion a remedy. And reverting to the 
preexisting law offers a readily available remedy. 
This slightly diverges from the descriptive reason cited earlier in the preliminary 
injunction standard. There, courts used the preexisting standard as a justification for 
preserving the status quo in election law cases.292 But when fashioning a remedy on 
the merits of the underlying claim, such as issuing a permanent injunction, courts can 
easily return to the preexisting state of the law. 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing how narrow the Democracy Ratchet looks 
here. In a dispute over an election law, the remedy would be to enjoin that statute 
generally or sever portions of the statute. That could be the case in voter identification 
law cases, when a court might enjoin application of the statute. But in other contexts, 
legislators might need to scramble for solutions to fill a void, or it might put the court 
in a position to determine what law should govern an election if it finds that an 
election law impermissibly burdens voters. And in the Arizona voting rights case, 
enjoining the statute would provide an identical solution to returning to the 
benchmark of the preexisting statute. But in some other cases, like determining how 
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Florida voters might be able to cure signatures on absentee ballots, there is no readily 
available solution if the statute is enjoined. Returning to the preexisting statute might 
be appropriate in such cases. 
E. An Example: Pasadena, Texas Voting Districts, 2017 
The Democracy Ratchet can serve these evidentiary and remedial functions with 
little effort. Indeed, in the Pasadena, Texas voting rights litigation, it worked quite 
well. But it was not included among the Democracy Ratchet examples above because 
the change was not a component of the substantive legal claim or very much of a 
consideration at all. 
Voters in the city of Pasadena, Texas chose members of its city council from eight 
single-member districts.293 In 2014, the city changed this plan to six single-member 
districts and two at-large districts.294 Plaintiffs challenged the redistricting plan under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.295 
The district court explained that Latinos had the opportunity to elect four of the 
eight seats under the old plan, but “[t]he change to Pasadena’s voting map and plan 
drops Latinos’ proportional opportunity” to three out of eight districts.296 It 
concluded that “reversion” to the previous system “was necessary to cure the dilution 
of Latino votes.”297 The court also went on under a separate Equal Protection claim 
to find that the city had engaged in intentional discrimination in passing the law.298 
But note that the court here barely needed the change as a component of its 
analysis. It simply evaluated Latino voting strength to indicate that four single-
member districts should be drawn for Latino voters.299 Whether the map was the 
result of a change or a long-standing practice, the result from the court would have 
been the same. But it helped, as an evidentiary matter, that the court could look to 
the past practice of Latino voters across eight single-member districts to evaluate 
Latino voting power. Additionally, the court did not need to fashion new maps for a 
remedy. It could easily revert to the old maps, which ensured that Latino voters 
would have the opportunity to elect members in four districts.300 
Of course, past election results are necessary to succeed in a Section 2 vote 
dilution claim.301 They can certainly be useful for Burdick claims.302 But while past 
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election results may not be necessary under vote denial claims, they could certainly 
be useful for courts examining whether a voting law deprives voters of their equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process, or to substantially burden their 
right to vote. 
V. REFINING THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET 
The Democracy Ratchet is not a component of any of the existing legal causes of 
action for typical election law litigation. But it may be a valuable evidentiary device 
that can be persuasive to courts considering changes to election laws, and it can 
provide a judicially manageable benchmark for issuing a remedy. 
That said, the Democracy Ratchet should be refined so that it can operate with 
greater precision. Courts in these cases have too quickly dismissed the substance of 
the causes of action they are tasked with enforcing when they invoke the Democracy 
Ratchet. They must ensure that the existing burdens of persuasion remain as 
substantive law has required, even in Democracy Ratchet cases. And they should 
recognize the costs to election laws and legislative experimentation that considers 
such costs, often imperfectly. 
A. Considering Alternative Opportunities 
There is a risk of overstating the severity of the burden placed on the right to vote 
when it comes to applying the Democracy Ratchet in the causes of action listed 
above. When a previously available voting practice or procedure is abolished, the 
relative burden on some voters has undoubtedly increased. But has it really added a 
burden that rises to the level of a legally cognizable injury? 
Consider voter identification laws. Despite soaring rhetoric about the impact of 
voter identification requirements, political science literature has revealed that in most 
jurisdictions, these laws have little if any impact on voter turnout, at least as studied 
so far.303 And when the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Indiana’s 
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voter identification law in Crawford, it concluded that a mere “inconvenience” has 
not been considered a “substantial” burden according to the Crawford plurality.304 
But the Crawford plurality’s decision to measure the impact only on the group 
directly affected by the law looked at a subset of the total population—and increased 
the likelihood of finding a substantial burden.305 A generally applicable law, like a 
new voter identification law, will ordinarily affect only a subset of the population, 
and often a small subset at that, meaning the overall burden is quite low.306 That’s 
the case for early voting opportunities in Ohio or ballot harvesting in Arizona. To 
demonstrate the burden, then, voters must not simply assert they would have used 
the previously available voting device, such as early voting or ballot delivery 
mechanisms. They must demonstrate that they were sufficiently burdened. But it is 
not enough for a litigant to insist that she took advantage of an opportunity that is no 
longer available; courts must look at alternative voting practices or procedures in 
determining the scope of the burden on the right to vote. 
Alternative opportunities are not always sufficient for voters, but they are 
necessarily a part of the inquiry, regardless of the cause of action. Courts may 
conclude that alternative means are so materially different from a candidate 
appearing on the ballot that they are not treated as adequate alternative opportunities. 
In Jenness,307 voters could engage in a variety of political activities, but the Court 
found the inability to associate by means of the ballot meant that alternative 
opportunities were insufficient.308 The Supreme Court has found that write-in voting 
opportunities are not an adequate substitute for a candidate’s name appearing in print 
on the ballot.309 In contrast, in Burdick,310 the lack of write-in access was not fatal to 
Hawaii’s ballot access law.311 Ample adequate alternative means existed for 
candidates and voters to associate with one another, even if the preferred means of a 
write-in candidacy was unavailable.312 
For Section 2 claims, the burden is measured in terms of the opportunities 
available to a protected group. But even in striking down North Carolina’s voter 
identification law, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that “it cannot be that states must 
forever tip-toe around certain voting provisions disproportionately used by 
minorities.”313 The burden, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, cannot arise just because a 
practice has been used by a particular group. Instead, it must be the case that the 
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group now has less opportunity than others, considering the “totality of the 
circumstances”—and that includes a demonstration of the burdens placed upon that 
group in pursuing other existing opportunities.314 
To succeed under a Section 2 claim, litigants must demonstrate that they have 
“less opportunity.”315 The inquiry is not whether they have “fewer opportunities” 
—assuredly a tempting gloss on the text when the Democracy Ratchet is in play. 
After all, eliminating a previously available voting opportunity would certainly 
present one fewer opportunity, and a court might easily elide over the text of the 
statute when concluding that this alone means that the litigant has proved that the 
change rises to a Section 2 violation. But it is one unsupported by the text of the 
statute, and it is one that is not a substantive part of the statute, anyway.316 
Here, perhaps, is simply a question of where the law ought to place the burden of 
persuasion. Typically, a challenger to a duly-enacted law would need to come 
forward with some quantum of evidence to demonstrate that the law ran afoul of the 
right to vote—the character and magnitude of the burden in Burdick, or that the voter 
had “less opportunity” to participate under Section 2. Under Section 2, if voters 
cannot avail themselves of alternative means of voting, such as voting on a different 
early voting day or finding a relative to collect their absentee ballot, then they might 
have “less opportunity.” If the elimination of once-available opportunities materially 
burdened them, it might run afoul of Burdick. The Democracy Ratchet would simply 
be a useful tool to demonstrate voting opportunities and participation in the political 
process. The state altering those opportunities doesn’t mean the plaintiffs win. It 
simply means plaintiffs can start at past practice in making their claims. 
B. Retaining Burdens of Persuasion 
The Democracy Ratchet is best understood as a limited tool of evidence and 
remedy, and its presence does not mean a challenger has presumptively demonstrated 
that the election law has impermissibly burdened their right to vote. The Democracy 
Ratchet does not alleviate responsibility of demonstrating that burden. 
Proponents of a strong Democracy Ratchet might presume that litigants have 
demonstrated an impermissible burden because of the change. That would require a 
greater showing from the state to overcome that assumed burden. Plaintiffs need not 
present quantitative evidence to demonstrate a burden,317 but this presumption might 
require substantial evidence, perhaps quantitative, to defend the law. Even assuming 
that one could collect the data, it becomes even more challenging for the state to 
establish that the burdened group would take advantage of (non-burden or low-
burden) alternative avenues—wholly the stuff of projection. The state, therefore, 
would have a significant evidentiary burden to meet if there is thin evidence of a 
demonstrated quantifiable impact and a preexisting expectation that a once-available 
voting practice or procedure should continue to remain in place. 
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Courts must carefully consider the Democracy Ratchet and avoid drifting into a 
strong version that alters the burdens of persuasion. The substantive law is not 
affected when the challenged voting practice or procedure stems from a recent 
change. It simply may be easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have been 
impermissibly burdened. 
To that end, the state legislature need not demonstrate some higher burden of 
proof justifying the change, nor does the burden shift to the state to justify the change. 
The evidentiary weight of the change—when properly understood in the context of 
all available voting opportunities318—is simply more persuasive when litigants can 
point to concrete instances of past exercise of those opportunities. 
This is not unlike the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Communications 
Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.319 The FCC had long determined that 
isolated or fleeting broadcast expletives were not indecent and would not lead to 
enforcement against networks airing such incidents.320 But the FCC changed its 
position over time, and by 2004 declared that a single fleeting expletive might rise 
to the level of indecent language subject to an enforcement action.321 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Agency’s power to change its mind, and that such a change was 
not subject to “heightened” review under the Administrative Procedure Act.322 The 
Agency still needed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision, but it did not 
need to explain that its new position was better than the old one.323 While only an 
analogous case under the Administrative Procedure Act, it is instructive when 
considering how changes to election laws should be evaluated. Unlike Section 5 
claims, where the burden was expressly on the enacting jurisdiction to justify the 
change, these substantive claims require no such additional justification or 
heightened scrutiny. While the Democracy Ratchet may not require greater 
justifications from the state, it will inevitably require some countervailing evidence 
when litigation arises. 
C. Ensuring Symmetrical Treatment of Election Laws 
Of course, it may well be the case that there is simply an irreconcilable conflict 
of views over legislative power and voting laws, complicated by these open-ended 
legal standards. One view is a symmetrical approach: voting laws are like just about 
any other kind of law—as a matter of policy and acting within certain acceptable 
boundaries, the legislature can expand or contract voting opportunities as it deems 
appropriate, every time subject to external constraints on its power to burden the 
“right to vote.” The other view is an asymmetrical approach: contraction of 
opportunities ought to be scrutinized with greater skepticism. That asymmetrical 
approach provides the initial framework for the Democracy Ratchet. 
This asymmetry has drawn some concern in lower courts. Ninth Circuit Judge Jay 
Bybee wondered how Arizona’s decision to limit ballot harvesting might comport 
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with the fact that ballot harvesting is prohibited in a number of states.324 The choice 
is a challenging one: identical provisions rise and fall together across the country; or 
identical provisions are treated differently in each jurisdiction. 
It is worth pausing to reflect on two types of asymmetry. The first is asymmetry 
in how courts scrutinize changes to election laws. This Article has argued that courts 
cannot substantively incorporate a non-retrogression principle into existing legal 
doctrines. Judicial scrutiny of changes to election laws looks the same whether the 
law is longstanding or of recent vintage. But the evidence available to parties looks 
different in the context of the Democracy Ratchet. 
The second is asymmetry in voting rights across jurisdictions. That arises in the 
opening hypothetical: one state has ample early voting, the other has none. Voting 
rights opportunities look different across jurisdictions. 
There are good reasons to think that the Voting Rights Act and Burdick ought to 
differ across jurisdictions, and not simply for the pragmatic reasons listed above. To 
begin, the Constitution assumes that the right to vote will vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. The right to vote for members of the House turns on each state’s 
qualifications to vote for the most numerous branch of the state legislature.325 The 
same for voting for members of the Senate.326 The times, places, and manner of 
elections will vary by state unless Congress standardizes it.327 The opportunity to 
choose presidential electors depends on state law.328 The American system of 
elections is built upon an expectation that the right to vote varies across jurisdictions. 
The burdens places upon voters are context specific, dependent upon the evidence 
in each jurisdiction. Professor Tokaji has noted that context can, in fact, vary from 
state to state:  
In one state, for example, in-person early voting may be very important 
for racial minorities, while another state may not choose to offer it at all. 
A much higher percentage of racial minorities may have qualifying voter 
ID in one state than another. The same holds true of registration rules, 
provisional ballots, and virtually all other elements of a state’s system. It 
follows that the effect of a change in election rules in one state may be 
very different from the effect of a similar-looking change in a different 
state.329 
Courts are invited to examine the particular burdens in a jurisdiction, and the burdens 
may vary from state to state—no different from the fact that the right to vote itself 
may vary from state to state. Section 2 vote dilution claims may vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on evidence of voter behavior.330 
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It may well be the case that the absence of early voting opportunities is an 
impermissible burden; it could also be the case that eliminating a previously available 
opportunity is the same. Or, the long-absent opportunity and the recently-altered 
opportunity pose no impermissible burdens. The baselines simply differ across 
jurisdictions depending on the context of the right to vote in that jurisdiction. That 
may be cold comfort to those who desire greater uniformity in our election system, 
but asymmetry is inevitable when it comes to the right to vote as long as it is 
principally administered by the states. 
D. Evaluating Costs in the Overall Electoral System 
Courts uncritically accepting Democracy Ratchet may give short shrift to the costs 
that new and expanded voting opportunities offer—costs that may appear 
counterintuitive without careful examination. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
more opportunities to participate in the political process are invariably good. And the 
Democracy Ratchet in its present form tends to prefer the status quo of more 
opportunities over a change that reduces opportunities.331 But political science data 
shows a decidedly mixed portrait of some of these expanded opportunities. 
For instance, early voting opportunities spread out the election process over a 
series of weeks, and an early-voting electorate may not have all of the information 
that the electorate has on Election Day. Late information affects the political process, 
and legislatures might prefer for voters to vote when they have the most 
information.332 Late-breaking information might affect voter behavior.333 Candidates 
who drop out of a race, especially a presidential primary, might yield early “wasted” 
votes.334 Perhaps there are better legislative solutions than limiting early voting 
opportunities. Instant runoff voting might be the preferable option.335 Political 
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science literature tends to show that early voters are among the most partisan voters 
who are highly reliable in their preferred candidate and unlikely to change their vote 
based on late-breaking information, so perhaps such concerns are overstated.336 Early 
voting may not even advantage groups of voters in ways that partisan legislatures 
anticipate.337 Further, perhaps these concerns are most problematic with presidential 
primaries, the circumstance where candidates are unusually likely to drop out before 
an election. 
There is mixed evidence about the benefits of other voting practices and 
procedures, too. There is some evidence supporting the argument that early voting 
actually decreases turnout,338 or at least does not affect turnout as much as one might 
anticipate.339 Basic financial cost issues, simplistic as they may be, would also drive 
marginal legislative decisions.340 
The Democracy Ratchet best functions as a useful tool of evidence and a readily 
available remedy. But it cannot supplant broad examination of all the evidence, 
including critical—even generalized—evidence that may run counter to the court’s 
intuitions.341 
In the cases that have invoked the Democracy Ratchet, perhaps the plaintiffs 
simply amassed more evidence and were more persuasive,342 particularly in 
situations where the courts addressed the evidence under a preliminary injunction 
standard.343 This Article does not attempt to parse the evidentiary records developed 
in each of the cases identified in Part I. But in each case, it would provide more 
deference to legislative judgments in these areas, particularly in areas with limited 
empirical evidence. While the justifications for the change may be tenuous, they may 
be no more tenuous than the justifications for expanding the voting practices or 
procedures in the first place. Fairly generalized evidence might be enough for the 
state to meet its burden of justifying the law.344 Indeed, state-specific evidence may 
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be a challenge to obtain—much less any evidence in short-fuse election litigation 
over a law whose impact is quite unknown. 
Measurement of election participation may conceal the effects of the law. 
Consider the hypothetical voter identification law that bolsters turnout for those who 
have gained confidence under this new fraud-preventing law,345 but that reduces 
turnout for others who lack the form of identification or are discouraged because they 
believe (rightly or wrongly) that they lack the proper form of identification.346 The 
best ways to measure the impact of voter identification laws remains deeply 
unsettled.347 
Litigants may rightly respond that if evidence has been introduced demonstrating 
that the law burdens minority voters and interacts with social and historical 
conditions, that should be good enough under Section 2; if it removes an opportunity 
some voters once used, that should be good enough to demonstrate a substantial 
burden under Burdick that requires more persuasive justification from the state. But 
as cold as it may sound, voters need not be guaranteed the right to exercise the most 
convenient voting practices and procedures. That is, neither Section 2 nor the Burdick 
balancing test requires that. Maximum voting convenience may be a desirable policy 
goal for some, but it is not the stuff of present election law claims. 
E. Recognizing Legislative Experimentation 
As a simple matter of incentives, a more modest Democracy Ratchet permits 
greater leeway for legislatures to experiment. State legislatures could experiment 
with expanding new voting opportunities, then contracting them later, with little 
justification for either the expansion or the contraction. After all, it is a fairly costless 
decision for the legislature to decide to experiment and create new and different 
voting opportunities. If a strong Democracy Ratchet prevents states from contracting 
opportunities later, however, state legislatures may choose not to expand in the first 
place. Limiting the Democracy Ratchet to an evidentiary and remedial function 
would prevent this disincentive. 
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But one wonders how persuasive this justification may be. It remains deeply 
unsettled whether legislatures heed the judiciary very closely, if at all, when 
considering new legislation.348 That said, preclearance under Section 5 emphatically 
did alter legislative behavior—legislatures knew that every election law would need 
preclearance, and legislatures tailored legislation as a result.349 Additionally, a more 
robust Democracy Ratchet might simply demand that the legislature come forward 
with reasons for narrowing opportunities—even if the state needed no reasons to 
expand those opportunities. Without rehashing the earlier discussion,350 existing laws 
in a post–Shelby County world anticipate symmetrical treatment of state election 
laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Challenges to laws that eliminate or alter voting procedures or practices will 
continue to fill judicial dockets. We are entering a time of greater single-party 
partisan control of state legislatures and governor’s mansions than at any point in 
recent history;351 an uptick in election law-related litigation;352 and renewed concern 
of fraud (actual or perceived), from illegal voting to hacking election systems.353 
New legislation is always forthcoming. 
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Courts and litigants have turned to the Democracy Ratchet under a variety of legal 
theories. It offers a fairly stable benchmark for courts to consider the impact of a new 
law, and it allows litigants to preserve existing voting practices or procedures that 
they prefer. But the theory, while descriptive in practice, has lacked a sufficient basis 
in the text of the Constitution, federal statutes, or judicial precedent. There is some 
support for a version of the Democracy Ratchet in Section 2 litigation—particularly 
when the legislature’s justification is tenuous, the practice interacts with social and 
historical conditions, and minority voters demonstrate that they have less opportunity 
than other voters because of the change in the law. The same holds true in the Burdick 
balancing test—eliminating a previously available voting practice or procedure may 
result in a substantial burden being placed upon the voters. 
 But a strong Democracy Ratchet that incorporates a kind of non-retrogression 
analysis into Section 2, or one that elevates the Burdick balancing test into something 
of similar strength, lacks a legal basis—indeed, it may overstate the burdens on voters 
and unnecessarily limit legislatures. Instead, the Democracy Ratchet is best 
understood as providing two limited functions for courts. First, it enables them to 
more readily rely upon the evidence presented by litigants who can demonstrate 
actual past use of the procedure. Second, if the court finds that the practice does run 
afoul of a substantive claim, the court can readily revert to the past practice. 
Perhaps354 the Democracy Ratchet will put state legislatures on notice to develop 
a more robust record for any change to election laws. And maybe that’s the necessary 
trade-off—voters can’t afford the loss of opportunities because of the incalculable 
nature of them, and our instincts are that we simply conclude that more opportunities 
are better than fewer opportunities. But policy instincts are different than substantive 
legal claims, and the Democracy Ratchet ought to function, and can function 
effectively, in its limited role as an evidentiary device and a readily available remedy. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 354. This Article has included the word “perhaps” more than a dozen times. That is far 
more uncertainty than the Author would prefer to include in an academic piece like this one. 
But it reflects the open questions surrounding how courts have gone about using the 
Democracy Ratchet, and the highly fact-specific context in individual cases that have led to 
superficial inconsistencies among jurisdictions. Without quantitative evidence, given frequent 
legislative innovation, and with deeply uncertain ability to isolate the precise impacts of any 
changes to election laws, some uncertainty is inevitable. 
